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Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani 
 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has been hailed as the epitome of a 
new generation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) at the crossroads of 
environmental protection and development.1 At the time of its inception, it marked a 
departure from earlier international environmental law instruments by supporting a 
balance between conservation and sustainable use rather than a blanket preference for 
conservation.2 It introduced novel legal concepts such as biodiversity,3 ecosystems,4 
genetic resources and biotechnology, benefit sharing, and traditional knowledge.5 It 
provided an innovative and flexible framework for accommodating developed and 
developing countries’ concerns and capacities6 and for encouraging partnerships 
between national and local authorities, local and indigenous communities, and the 
private sector.7  
At the same time, the CBD has also attracted intense criticism for its vague 
and heavily qualified text, which is fraught with loopholes.8 It has also been 
considered an ineffective and fragmented process that has had little impact on state 
practice, making instead a continuous attempt to expand its subject matter without 
fully achieving or systematically assessing progress on previously agreed 
commitments.9 To some extent, these shortcomings have been explained by the ‘vast 
scope of the Convention and its emphasis on an integrated approach,’ but they may 
also reflect a lack of prioritization in agenda setting, which makes it impossible for 
the CBD Conference of the Parties (COP) to devote sufficient attention to all thematic 
areas.10 They may further be due to the fact that the convention’s scope entails action 
                                                
The title of this article is inspired by the Italian film Ieri, oggi, domani (1963), directed by Vittorio de 
Sica. The authors are very grateful to Annalisa Savaresi, Jacques Hartmann, David Cooper 
(Convention on Biological Diversity), and Andrew Brooke for their comments on an early 
draft of this article. The authors, who have attended meetings of the CBD bodies in an 
observer capacity since 2005 and 1999 respectively, remain solely responsible for any error or 
omission.  
1 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 822 (1992) [CBD]. L. Glowka et al., A Guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1994); C. Tinker, A New Breed of Treaty: The United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 12 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 191 (1995). 
2 S. Johnston, The Convention on Biological Diversity: The Next Phase 6 R.E.C.I.E.L. 219 (1997). 
3 R. Rayfuse, Biological Resources, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée, and E. Hey, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, 362 (2007). 
4 D. Tarlock, Ecosystems, in Bodansky, Brunnée, and Hey supra note 3, 574. 
5 A. Meyer, International Environmental Law and Human Rights: Towards the Explicit Recognition of 
Traditional Knowledge 10 R.E.C.I.E.L. 37 (2001). 
6 D. McGraw, The CBD: Key Characteristics and Implications for Development 11 R.E.C.I.E.L. 17 
(2002).  
7 L. Kimball, Institutional Linkages between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Other 
International Conventions 6 R.E.C.I.E.L. 239 (1997). 
8 M. Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer 4 
Colorado J. Int’l Envt’l L. 141 (1993). Note that P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, 
International Law and the Environment, at 617 (2009), argue that it is necessary to ‘look more 
to the implementation process than the textual analysis of the Convention’s provisions in 
order to measure its contribution to the conservation of biodiversity.’ 
9 McGraw, supra note 6 at 23. 
10 Johnston, supra note 2 at 223 and 225. 
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on the ground by a wide range of national and local authorities, which often work in 
isolation, thus creating another stream of implementation problems. 
Despite its detractions, the convention has now reached almost universal 
membership.11 The notable exception is the United States, which nonetheless 
participates in the CBD process and, at least to some extent, supports the convention’s 
role and some of its outputs.12 The biannual meetings of its COP are high-profile 
decision-making events at which non-parties, international governmental and non-
governmental organizations, indigenous peoples’ representatives, prominent business 
associations, and research institutes actively participate with great investment in time 
and resources. More importantly, the CBD COP’s normative activity is testimony to 
an intense, evolving, and creative interpretation of the convention by the international 
community.13 
In light of the almost twenty years of implementation, we should ‘look afresh’ 
at the convention to assess its evolution and current legal significance with a view to 
better understanding its immediate future.14 To this end, this article critically analyzes 
the outcomes of the tenth COP (COP-10), with a view to determining progress in the 
development and implementation of the CBD and highlighting key future directions 
both at the level of international cooperation and national implementation.15  
After briefly introducing the modus operandi of the convention, the article 
outlines the legal and policy relevance of the international community’s failure to 
meet the global target of reducing significantly the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010. 
Attention then focuses on the process and main outcomes of COP-10, which is 
arguably the most important CBD COP thus far, and assesses these outcomes with a 
                                                
11 For an overview of the status of ratification/acceptance of the CBD, see 
<http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/>. 
12 While it is well beyond the scope of this article to assess the United States’s practice vis-à-vis the 
CBD, three instances can be identified to support the view that the United States is involved in 
the CBD process. First, by participating in the CBD process itself – for instance, the United 
States participated actively in the negotiations of a CBD moratorium on geo-engineering (see 
E. Morgera, Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law 2 Climate Law 85 at 96 (2011)). 
Second, the United States occasionally supports CBD outcomes in other international fora – 
for instance, the United States supported the use of the CBD scientific criteria on ecologically 
and biologically significant areas in the context of the UN General Assembly’s Working 
Group on Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (see Summary of the 
Fourth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating 
to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of 
National Jurisdiction, 31 May - 3 June 2011 25(70) Earth Negotiations Bulletin (6 June 2011) 
at 7). Third, the United States includes text supporting implementation of the CBD in its 
bilateral free trade agreements. See, for instance, Article 18.11 of the 2009 US-Peru Trade 
Promotion Agreement and S. Jinnah, Strategic Linkages: The Evolving Role of Trade 
Agreements in Global Environmental Governance 20 J. Env’t & Dev. 191 at 197-98 and 209 
(2011). 
13 For a discussion of the significant evolution of the interpretation of the CBD references to benefit 
sharing, see E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking 
Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods,15 R.E.C.I.E.L. 150 (2010). 
14 Case Concerning Gabcikovo and Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 
September 1997, [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 92; 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998). at para. 140. 
15 The tenth Conference of the Parties (COP-10) adopted forty-nine decisions. This article will address 
a significant handful of them. For the full text of all COP-10 decisions, see the official report 
of the meeting (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010), 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-10/official/cop-10-27-en.pdf>). For an earlier 
assessment, see E. Morgera, CBD COP 10: Towards Post-2010 Implementation 40 Envt’l 
Pol’y & L. 281 (2010). 
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
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view to discussing the future of the convention. To this end, the article offers a brief 
analysis of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol),16 in 
order to clarify how the operationalization of the third objective of the CBD may 
influence the implementation of the whole CBD regime.17 The article then assesses 
COP-10 decisions on indigenous and local communities and traditional knowledge, 
exploring the reciprocal influence between the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and the CBD.18 The legal implications of the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011-20 are then identified, followed by a discussion of the 
developments in addressing the relationship between sustainable funding and 
successful implementation and of the increasing attention paid by the CBD parties to 
climate change impacts and response measures. Finally, the article discusses the main 
outcome of the fifth Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety,19 briefly assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Nagoya-Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress (Supplementary Protocol) 
and its role in the overall CBD regime.20 The conclusions identify the challenges 
posed by the significant evolution of the CBD’s scope as well as the increased need 
for coherent implementation of its three objectives at the international and national 
level. 
 
I. SETTING THE CONTEXT: THE CBD’S MODUS OPERANDI  
 
Widely seen as a framework convention, the CBD provides a flexible conceptual 
structure for both international cooperation and national implementation.21 On the one 
hand, the convention allows for its further development through the negotiation of 
annexes and protocols.22 It builds upon pre-existing agreements while establishing a 
wider context in which such agreements (notably species- and area-based 
international environmental agreements) should be interpreted and implemented.23 On 
                                                
16 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
<http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/> [Nagoya Protocol]. Negotiations were held within the CBD 
Working Group on ABS, in accordance with the mandate received by COP-7, following the 
call of the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development to negotiate, within the CBD 
framework, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources (Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (4 September 2002), Resolution 2, Annex, para. 
44(o)).  
17 According to Article 1 of the CBD, supra note 1, the third CBD objective is ‘the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding.’ 
18 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Resolution 61/295 (13 September 
2007). 
19 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000). 
20 2010 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/NKL_Protocol.shtml> [Supplementary 
Protocol]. 
21 McGraw, supra note 6 at 18, n. 10. 
22 CBD, supra note 1, Articles 28 and 30. 
23 McGraw, supra note 6 at 18-19, n. 21, who argues that the CBD is not formally an ‘umbrella’ 
convention because it does not supersede previous agreements but has the normative character 
of an umbrella convention in articulating new norms that could also apply to pre-existing 
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the other hand, implementation at the national level is particularly significant given 
that ‘the Convention is dealing with the management of an essentially domestic 
resource,’24 thus relying heavily on the development of national biodiversity strategies 
and action plans (NBSAPs).25  
Over time, the convention has developed a complex system of processes and 
instruments for its implementation at the international level. The CBD’s text provides 
for regular meetings of the COP26 and the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, 
and Technological Advice (SBSTTA).27 The COP is principally mandated to keep 
under review the implementation of the convention, including by undertaking ‘any 
additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this 
Convention in the light of experience gained in its operation.’28 On this basis, it has 
evolved into a prolific norm-creating body across all areas covered by the CBD and 
on issues that are directly or indirectly related to biodiversity.29 The SBSTTA, in turn, 
is mandated to provide ‘timely advice’ to the COP on the implementation of the 
convention. While it was expected to focus on scientific and technical advice, the 
SBSTTA has been criticized for the political nature of its debates and has often been 
seen as a pre-COP exercise in which scientists have limited input.30 
This ‘minimal’ governance structure has in time been increased to include 
various other subsidiary bodies, including the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
Sharing (ABS),31 which has been the forum for negotiating the Bonn Guidelines on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
Out of Their Utilization (Bonn Guidelines)32 and the Nagoya Protocol; the Working 
Group on Article 8(j), addressing issues related to the protection of traditional 
knowledge;33 the Working Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention 
(WGRI), which is called upon to examine the implementation of the convention, 
including NBSAPs;34 and the Working Group on Protected Areas, which was 
convened to guide and monitor the implementation of the CBD programme of work 
                                                                                                                                      
agreements. See also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 8 at 615-16, who agree that the 
CBD is a framework, but not an umbrella, convention. 
24 Johnston, supra note 2 at 226-27. 
25 In accordance with Article 6 of the CBD, supra note 1, which states: ‘Each Contracting Party shall, 
in accordance with its particular conditions and capabilities: (a) Develop national strategies, 
plans or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or adapt 
for this purpose existing strategies, plans or programmes which shall reflect, inter alia, the 
measures set out in this Convention relevant to the Contracting Party concerned; and (b) 
integrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies.’ 
26 Ibid., Article 23.  
27 Ibid., Article 25. 
28 Ibid., Article  23(4). 
29 As an indication of the exponential normative activity of the COP, it is noted that the number of 
decisions adopted by the COP raised from twelve at COP-1 to forty-seven at COP-10 (see 
<http://www.cbd.int/decisions/>). 
30 Johnston, supra note 2 at 225. 
31 Decision V/26 on Access to Genetic Resources, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000) at para. 
11. 
32 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising Out of Their Utilization, adopted by Decision VI/24 on Access and Benefit-Sharing as 
Related to Genetic Resources, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002) [Bonn Guidelines]. 
33 Decision IV/9 on Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/4/27 (1998) at para. 1, 
34 Decision VII/30 on the Strategic Plan: Future Evaluation of Progress, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (2004).  
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
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on protected areas.35 These working groups have been coupled with the creation of ad 
hoc technical expert groups (AHTEGs) and other less formal groups or meetings. 
This institutional proliferation is worth analyzing from a two-fold perspective. 
First, it has resulted in the continuous refinement of the CBD provisions, through the 
development of thematic and crosscutting programmes of work, and the adoption of 
guidelines, principles, and other COP decisions. Second, this system is characterized 
by the lack of a mechanism to monitor national-level compliance, notwithstanding the 
reliance on national regulation for CBD implementation.  
The CBD programmes of work are the main instrument that CBD parties use 
to achieve the commitments contained in the convention. They include guidelines for 
national implementation, often recommending reforms of national laws, policies, or 
administrative practices.36 The work programmes also identify tasks for furthering 
implementation at the international level (for instance, assigning tasks to the CBD 
COP and subsidiary bodies with a view to the further refinement of CBD provisions 
or concepts) as well as opportunities for collaboration between the CBD and other 
international instruments or processes.37  
The CBD guidelines and principles are specifically aimed at influencing the 
conduct of CBD parties, non-party governments, inter-governmental organizations, as 
well as private companies and indigenous and local communities.38 While the CBD’s 
work programmes and guidelines can thus be distinguished as inward and outward 
instruments respectively, work programmes in practice have also often been designed 
to shape external behaviour.39 Both work programmes and guidelines evidence an 
increasing emphasis on the contribution of non-state actors, particularly the private 
sector, to CBD implementation40 and an evolving interpretation of the convention in 
                                                
35 Decision COP VII/28 on Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e)), Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 
(2004). 
36 The CBD COP has established seven thematic work programs, namely on agricultural biodiversity, 
dry and sub-humid lands biodiversity, forest biodiversity, inland waters biodiversity, island 
biodiversity, marine and coastal biodiversity, and mountain biodiversity; and five crosscutting 
work programs on incentive measures, the Global Taxonomy Initiative, protected areas, 
Article 8(j) (traditional knowledge), and technology transfer and cooperation. Work has also 
been undertaken on a series of other crosscutting issues, including climate change and 
biodiversity, the ecosystem approach, and sustainable use of biodiversity. See 
<http://www.cbd.int/programmes/>. 
37 On the latter aspect, see Kimball, supra note 7 at 241, commenting on the ‘integrative’ and 
‘supplementary’ role of the CBD vis-à-vis other multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs). 
38 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines on Sustainable Use (Decision VII/12 on Sustainable Use 
(Article 10), Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21  (2004)); Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for 
the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Regarding 
Developments Proposed to Take Place, or Which Are Likely to Impact on Sacred Sites, and 
Lands, and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous People and Local 
Communities (Decision VII/16F on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (2004)); guiding principles on invasive alien species (Decision VI/23 
on Alien Species That Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002)). 
39 For instance, in the context of the sustainable production of biofuels, the CBD COP included among 
relevant CBD guidelines the work program on protected areas and the work program on 
traditional knowledge (CBD, supra note 1, Article 8(j); and Decision V/16 on Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000)). 
40 Morgera and Tsioumani, supra note 13 at 158 and 165-66. For an elaboration in the context of other 
international standards for corporate accountability, see E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability 
in International Environmental Law (2009), chapter 8. 
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ways that significantly depart from its letter.41 
The evolution in the convention’s interpretation and the overall coherence of 
the various instruments adopted by the COP have been obscured, however, by the 
convoluted, repetitious, and disorderly drafting of the CBD COP decisions.42 This is 
an obstacle not only for national policy makers involved in implementing the 
convention but also for negotiators hoping to ensure mutual supportiveness between 
the convention and other international processes. To complicate matters further, the 
CBD Secretariat has discontinued the publication of its Handbook to the CBD, which 
provided a synthetic guide to the myriad of decisions adopted by the CBD COP.43 
The second noteworthy feature of the CBD’s institutional framework is that, 
notwithstanding the emphasis on national implementation, there is no mechanism to 
systematically and effectively monitor implementation and compliance at the national 
level. The CBD COP does not review individual national reports but, rather, offers 
conclusions on the basis of the CBD Secretariat’s syntheses of these reports.44 This 
examination tends to focus on the mere submission of the report and on a quantitative 
analysis of legislative developments (for instance, the percentage of parties with 
biodiversity-related legislation in place) rather than on a qualitative analysis of the 
content of the national reports, including the quality and comprehensiveness of 
national legislation and impacts of state measures on biodiversity and achievement of 
the CBD objectives. The SBSTTA has also engaged in the analysis of national 
reports,45 as well as in the so-called ‘in-depth reviews’ of the implementation of the 
CBD work programmes, on the basis of work done by the Secretariat and the expert 
groups established by the COP for that purpose. These efforts, however, have not 
reached the heart of national implementation either. As a result, these exercises are 
unlikely to be effective in keeping tabs on implementation in various countries. They 
generally provide an indication of trends and some best practices but have not been 
used for ‘name and shame’ purposes or for identifying specific countries in need of 
assistance.46 The creation of the WGRI did not necessarily provide any added value in 
terms of monitoring compliance by parties, as that working group has mostly focused 
on streamlining the processes within the CBD and ensuring cooperation between the 
CBD and other international or national non-state actors. 
                                                
41 For a discussion of the CBD parties’ dynamic interpretation of benefit sharing beyond the letter of 
the CBD’s Articles 1, 8, and 15, see Morgera and Tsioumani, supra note 13 at 155-56 and 
159-60. 
42 CBD parties have long complained of this (see, for instance, Decision X/12 on Ways and Means to 
Improve the Effectiveness of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010), para. 6, which reads: ‘[The COP] requests 
the Executive Secretary to streamline the texts of suggested draft recommendations for 
submission to the Subsidiary Body and encourages Parties to make these recommendations as 
short as possible so that the actions required are clear’). Note that the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice’s (SBSTTA) recommendations form the 
basis of the majority of the CBD COP decisions and that this problematic drafting practice is 
reflected across all of the other sub-processes that contribute to formulating the rest of the 
CBD COP decisions. 
43 The latest edition (the third) was published in 2007 and covered decisions adopted by COP-7, which 
was held in 2004. See Handbook to the CBD, <http://www.cbd.int/handbook/>. 
44 Y. Xiang and S. Meehan, Financial Cooperation, Rio Conventions and Common Concerns 14 
R.E.C.I.E.L. 212 at 218 (2005). 
45 CBD, supra note 1, Articles 25-26. 
46 As opposed, for instance, to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat, 11 I.L.M. 963 (1972). See comments by Jamie Pittock, A Pale Reflection 
of Political Reality: Integration of Global Climate, Wetland and Biodiversity Agreements 1 
Climate Law 343 at 363-64 (2010). 
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
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A few steps were taken at COP-10 to address the structural problems of the 
CBD described earlier. The new Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-20,47 which is 
analyzed later in this article, explicitly tasks the COP to consider in 2012 the possible 
development of additional mechanisms to facilitate compliance with the convention 
and the plan or the need to strengthen the SBSTTA or the WGRI to this end.48 This 
mandate signals parties’ increasing awareness of a gap in the CBD regime with regard 
to international monitoring of compliance, but it does not yet provide a clear 
indication of the response that will be devised to address it.  
The new strategic plan is supposed to serve as the framework and main 
guidance for the revision, updating, and implementation of NBSAPs and also points 
to the CBD programmes of work as key tools for updating NBSAPs.49 These are other 
welcome steps, as the first comprehensive assessment of NBSAPs that was launched 
during COP-10 indicated that, while NBSAPs are indeed an indispensable step 
towards implementation and have generated concrete results in many countries, they 
have not attenuated the main drivers of biodiversity loss or contributed to 
mainstreaming biodiversity in a broader development policy context.50 Until recently, 
international guidance on NBSAPs has been limited and almost exclusively based on 
COP decisions.51 However, a series of regional and sub-regional workshops held 
during 2008-10 proved to be of significant assistance in guiding the drafting and 
review of national legislation and implementation in general, possibly suggesting a 
new approach for facilitating CBD implementation. Workshop participants – most of 
whom were responsible for CBD implementation at the national level – considered 
the workshops to be highly successful and stressed that the CBD should move away 
from policy development through international negotiations and focus more on 
strengthening implementation on the ground.52 This recognition motivated the 
decision of the Japanese COP presidency to fund another series of capacity-building 
workshops through the establishment of the Japan Biodiversity Fund.53 Thus, even 
though international oversight of compliance under the CBD is lacking (at least for 
the time being), international guidance from the CBD can still positively influence 
national-level implementation in the immediate future.  
 
II. MISSING THE 2010 TARGET: LEARNING THE HARD WAY 
 
Lack of effective implementation of the CBD was clearly demonstrated in the 
international community’s failure to meet the global target of reducing significantly 
the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010. This target had been adopted by the CBD COP 
                                                
47 Decision X/2 on the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, 
Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010). 
48 Ibid. at paras. 14-15. We are grateful to David Cooper for drawing our attention to this point. 
49 Ibid. at para. 15. 
50 C. Prip et al., Biodiversity Planning: An Assessment of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action 
Plans (2010). For an earlier assessment, see P. Herkenrath, The Implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity – A Non-Government Perspective Ten Years On 11 
R.E.C.I.E.L. 29 at 31-33 (2002), who noted that the first set of national biodiversity strategies 
and action plans (NBSAPs) highlighted a lack of basic knowledge due to limited capacity in 
taxonomy, lack of progress in national implementation of the convention, inadequacy of 
national protected area systems, and limited government support. 
51 See, for instance, Decision IX/8 on Review of Implementation of Goals 2 and 3 of the Strategic Plan, 
Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (2008) at para. 8. 
52 Prip et al., supra note 50 at 106. 
53 See CBD webpages on NBSAPs workshops, <http://www.cbd.int/nbsap/workshops2.shtml> and on 
the Japan Biodiversity Fund, <http://www.cbd.int/jbf/>. 
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in 2002, with a view to measuring the impact of the convention.54 The third edition of 
the Global Biodiversity Outlook,55 released in mid-2010, provided scientific evidence 
that the global target had not been met, stressing the major implications for current 
and future human well-being, including the provision of food, fibre, medicines, and 
fresh water, the pollination of crops, the filtration of pollutants, and the protection 
from natural disasters. The causes of the failure ranged from the insufficient scale of 
action to implement the convention, the insufficient integration of biodiversity issues 
into broader policies, the insufficient attention to the underlying drivers of 
biodiversity loss, and the insufficient inclusion of the real benefits of biodiversity, and 
the costs of its loss, within economic systems and markets. According to the Global 
Biodiversity Outlook, better protection of biodiversity should be seen as a prudent and 
cost-effective investment in risk-avoidance for the global community, with continued 
direct action to conserve biodiversity targeting species and ecosystems that are 
vulnerable, culturally valued, and of importance to the poor.56 
The Global Biodiversity Outlook, as well as parallel work leading to the 
preparation of the new strategic plan for the convention, were clearly influenced by 
the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.57 This was an earlier global scientific 
process that facilitated global endorsement of the term ‘ecosystem services’ as the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems,58 and it increased attention on the 
contribution of biodiversity to human well-being and development under the 
convention.59 Overall, these scientific and conceptual developments have shed new 
light on the CBD’s preambular language on biodiversity’s importance for meeting the 
food, health, and other needs of the world’s growing population and on biodiversity’s 
social, economic, scientific, cultural, and other values. Conceptualizing ecosystem 
services therefore highlighted the links between biodiversity and human development 
and, to that extent, ‘modernized’ the concept of sustainable use.60  
Against this background, some key priorities, with policy and legal 
implications for the future of the CBD, can be derived from the documented failure to 
reach the 2010 global target, namely a new and unprecedented emphasis on: 
mainstreaming biodiversity across different policy areas and instruments; restoring 
degraded biological resources and ecosystem services, in addition to conservation and 
                                                
54 The target was first agreed upon by the CBD COP through Decision VI/26 on Strategic Plan for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002) at para. 11. It 
was subsequently endorsed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (4 September 2002), Resolution 2, Annex, 
para. 44), and the United Nations General Assembly (2005 World Summit Outcome, 
Resolution 60/1 (24 October 2005) at para. 56). 
55 CBD and UN Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC), Global 
Biodiversity Outlook (2010), <http://gbo3.cbd.int/> [Global Biodiversity Outlook]. 
56 Ibid. at 22. 
57 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis (2005), 
<http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx>. For a discussion of legal implications, see E. 
Morgera, The 2005 UN World Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full Glass 
15 Italian Y.B. Int’l L. 53 (2006). 
58 Such as food, water, timber, and fibre; regulating services that affect climate, floods, diseases, 
wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual 
benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling. 
59 See the launch of the Biodiversity for Development Initiative in 2008, which focuses on the role 
biodiversity can play for poverty alleviation and development. It should also be noted that the 
theme of the 2010 International Biodiversity Day was Biodiversity for Development and 
Poverty Alleviation. See CBD Secretariat, Biodiversity, Development and Poverty 
Alleviation: Recognizing the Role of Biodiversity for Human Well-being (2009). 
60 We are grateful to David Cooper for drawing our attention to this point. 
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sustainable use; valuing systematically the economic benefits of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services; and addressing the linkages between biodiversity and climate 
change.  
On the last point, the Global Biodiversity Outlook emphasizes the links 
between biodiversity and climate change and the interactions between the respective 
international regimes. It concludes that the linked challenges of biodiversity loss and 
climate change must be addressed with equal priority and in close coordination, if the 
most severe impacts of each are to be avoided,61 highlighting that ‘tipping points in 
biodiversity loss are most likely to be avoided if climate change mitigation to keep 
average temperature increases below two degrees Celsius is accompanied by action to 
reduce other factors pushing ecosystems towards a changed state.’62 Biodiversity 
conservation and, where necessary, the restoration of ecosystems were considered 
cost-effective interventions for both mitigation and adaptation purposes, with 
substantial co-benefits.63 
Finally, the launch of the synthesis report on the Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB) study during COP-10 further emphasized the need to assess and 
account for the economic value of biodiversity and ecosystem services as a means 
towards the enhanced conservation and sustainable management of natural 
resources.64 Emerging from the 2007 meeting of the G-8+5 Group of Environment 
Ministers in Potsdam, Germany,65 the TEEB process aimed to make the economic 
case for conservation, arguably to address an issue that was perceived as inadequately 
addressed by the millennium ecosystem assessment.66 One of the fundamental 
arguments behind the TEEB approach was that applying economic thinking to the use 
of biodiversity and ecosystem services could help to clarify two critical points: why 
prosperity and poverty reduction depend on maintaining the flow of benefits from 
ecosystems and why successful environmental protection needs to be grounded in 
sound economics, including explicit recognition, efficient allocation, and fair 
distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources.67 At the same time, TEEB’s high visibility was hoped to elevate the CBD 
                                                
61 Global Biodiversity Outlook, supra note 55 at 11 [emphasis added]. 
62 Ibid. at 75. 
63 Ibid. at 83. See also M. Kok et al., Prospects for Mainstreaming Ecosystem Goods and Services in 
International Policies (2010), <http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2010/Prospects-for-
Mainstreaming-Ecosystem-Goods-and-Services-in-International-Policies>. 
64 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, 
conclusions and recommendations of TEEB (2010), <http://www.teebweb.org/>. 
65 The G-8+5 includes the heads of government from the G-8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus the heads of government of 
five emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa). The meeting was 
held on 15-17 March 2007 in Potsdam, their environment ministers decided to launch the 
Potsdam Initiative on Biological Diversity, including to ‘initiate the process of analysing the 
global economic benefit of biological diversity, the costs of the loss of biodiversity and the 
failure to take protective measures versus the costs of effective conservation’ in a global 
study. See the Potsdam Chair’s Conclusions, 
<http://www.bmu.de/english/international_environmental_policy/g8/doc/39119.php>.    
66 See C. Monfreda, Setting the Stage for New Global Knowledge: Science, Economics, and Indigenous 
Knowledge in ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ at the Fourth World 
Conservation Congress 8 Conservation and Society 276 at 279 (2010).  
67 TEEB, supra note 63 at 6. 
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profile in international decision making and to assist decision makers to recognize and 
integrate the values of ecosystems and biodiversity in all sectors.68 
Although the concept of ecosystem services as developed within the CBD 
framework has attempted to reconcile a rights-based and an economic approach to 
biodiversity policy, tensions persist. On the one hand, the concept of ecosystem 
services has served to facilitate an increased focus on the ecosystem approach, on its 
contribution to poverty eradication, and on the need for broader stakeholder 
engagement, by calling attention to the impacts of biodiversity loss on the most 
vulnerable sectors of society.69 On the other hand, the concept of ecosystem services 
emphasizes economic valuation as a key instrument for mainstreaming biodiversity in 
other sectors and for tackling effectively all the drivers of biodiversity loss70 (habitat 
loss and degradation, pollution, species over-exploitation, climate change, and 
invasive alien species).71  
 
III. ENLIGHTENED AUTHORITARIAN MULTILATERALISM? 
 
In addition to the pressure linked to the failure to reach the 2010 biodiversity target, 
CBD COP-10 was shaped by a series of other developments. Less than a year earlier, 
the climate change negotiations had collapsed in Copenhagen amid an unprecedented 
degree of global attention.72 This turn of events left some questioning the ability of 
the UN system to take decisive action on pressing environmental problems or the 
value of multilateralism generally.73 Copenhagen’s failure lowered hopes that the 
negotiations for an ABS protocol under the CBD could successfully reach agreement 
on the many complex and controversial issues remaining unresolved. To raise the 
pressure, during the September high-level meeting on biodiversity of the UN General 
Assembly,74 the G-77/China explicitly conditioned their support for the adoption of 
the strategic plan on the finalization of the Nagoya Protocol and on specific funding 
commitments, including a decision on the implementation of the convention’s 
                                                
68  In some ways, the aspiration for TEEB was to raise public awareness of the economic issues of 
biodiversity loss in much the same way as the Stern review did for climate change. See N. 
Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (2006). 
69 For instance, Decision X/4 on Third Edition of the Global Biodiversity Outlook: Implications for the 
Future Implementation of the Convention, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at paras. 
5(d) and (f), points to a series of rights-based strategies to prevent biodiversity loss: enhancing 
the benefits from biodiversity to contribute to local livelihoods; empowering indigenous and 
local community; and ensuring their participation in decision-making processes to protect and 
encourage their customary sustainable use of biological resources.  
70 Other future strategies to tackle biodiversity loss included in the same decision focus on: reflecting 
the benefits of biodiversity within economic systems; mainstreaming biodiversity concerns 
into planning and policy processes; and restoring degraded ecosystems. See Decision X/4, 
supra note 69 at paras. 5(a) and (e). On the latter point, note also that CBD COP-11, which is 
to be held in October 2012, is to identify ways and means to support ecosystem restoration, 
including through the development of practical guidance. Decision X/9 on the Multi-Year 
Programme of Work for the Conference of the Parties for the Period 2011-2020 and 
Periodicity of Meeting, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. (a)(ix). 
71 Global Biodiversity Outlook, supra note 55 at 55. 
72 On the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, see L. Rajamani, The Making and Unmaking of the 
Copenhagen Accord 59 I.C.L.Q.  824 (2010); D. Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference: A Post-Mortem 104(2) A.J.I.L. 230 (2010). 
73 Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 9(544) 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin 27 (2010), <http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/enb09544e.html>.   
74 Sixty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, high-level meeting of the General Assembly as a 
contribution to the International Year of Biodiversity, 22 September 2010. 
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
 11	  
Strategy for Resource Mobilization.75 Developing countries thus treated these issues 
as a package.76 
 Two days before the end of the meeting, however, the most contentious 
issues in the ABS negotiations – some of which are examined in the next section – 
remained unresolved. Similarly, the strategic plan and finance-related issues were not 
finalized. Acknowledging that the success of the meeting depended on the finalization 
of the ABS negotiations and eager to make the meeting a success, the Japanese COP 
presidency decided to convene a closed meeting in conjunction with the ministerial 
segment, including some, but not all, of the key negotiating groups.77 While this 
procedural arrangement is certainly not unprecedented for international negotiations 
where the most controversial issues are often resolved in closed meetings, the move 
upset some key negotiators that were left out, both for its alleged lack of transparency 
and for the significance of the issues it addressed.78 Nonetheless, the protocol’s text 
was finalized on the basis of the compromise proposal put forward by the Japanese 
presidency, which was found to be sufficiently respective of all of the groups’ 
priorities (while omitting altogether the most contentious issues). Then agreement was 
also reached on the strategic plan and on resource mobilization. The substantive 
finance pledges by the Japanese government for implementation of the strategic plan 
and development of NBSAPs, as well as for ABS, contributed to the success of the 
final deal.79 The Japanese contribution for ABS has been included, together with 
funds from France, Norway, and Switzerland, in the Nagoya Implementation Fund, 
which is managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and operated by the 
CBD Secretariat. The fund will support countries in ratifying the protocol, particularly 
building capacity to ensure appropriate access to, and use of, traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources, and will finance projects at the national and 
regional levels promoting technology transfer, private sector engagement, and the 
conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources.80  
                                                
75 See UNGA media release, 22 September 2010, 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10992.doc.htm>; and press conference on 
biodiversity by Minister for Environment of Brazil, 22 September 2010, 
<http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2010/100922_Brazil.doc.htm>. Brazilian minister 
Izabella Teixeira said the three issues must be adopted ‘as a package’ in Nagoya: conclusion 
of negotiations on the ABS protocol; agreement on the strategic plan; and agreement on a 
robust and effective resource mobilization strategy. See Summary of the Tenth Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 73. 
76 In the last phases of the CBD COP, the European Union proposed to also include the CBD budget in 
the package and, indeed, this is how these key outcomes of the COP were eventually adopted. 
See Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, supra note 73 at 25.  
77 Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra 
note 73 at 26. 
78 See G.N. Singh, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis, Ceblaw Brief (2011). Gurdial Singh of 
Malaysia, who was one of the key negotiators of the protocol, remarked: ‘It was a miraculous 
end to some 14 days of tumultuous and rancorous negotiations – marked by a break up of the 
solidarity of negotiating developing country groups, and secret deals. It was finally foisted, 
primarily upon developing countries, by the Japanese presidency of COP, in an atmosphere 
reminiscent more of a surrender ceremony than a triumphant outcome. The two Co-Chairs of 
the Working Group, who had presided over the process for more than the four preceding 
years, were conspicuously kept out of these final hours’ parallel processes.’ 
79 See CBD COP 10 Highlights: Wednesday, 27 October 2010 9(542) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
(2010), <http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/enb09542e.html>. See also the guidance circulated for the 
ministerial consultation [on file with authors]. 
80 GEF Establishes the Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund, CBD press release (3 June 2011), 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/press/2011/pr-2011-06-03-GEF-ImpFund-en.pdf>. 
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 The process raised some concerns about a possibly dangerous precedent of a 
lack of transparency in the CBD process, but the prevailing feeling in the closing 
plenary was one of satisfaction at an outcome that was generally acceptable and of 
restored trust in multilateral environmental negotiations. In many respects, the closed 
meeting that sealed the deal on the Nagoya Protocol does not seem comparable with 
its counterpart at COP-10 in Copenhagen in late 2009. Most notably, the Japanese 
COP presidency was largely considered open, cooperative, and constructive 
throughout most of the negotiations, and their efforts were appreciated as an attempt 
to find a balanced compromise within the deadline set for adoption of the protocol.81  
 
IV. ACCESS, BENEFIT SHARING, AND COMPLIANCE: THE ABC OF THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
 
Despite being assessed by many regional groups as ‘far from perfect,’82 the Nagoya 
Protocol,83 as a new legally binding instrument under the convention, can be 
considered the most important outcome of COP-10. It aims to operationalize the third 
objective of the CBD by setting out rules and procedures on access, benefit sharing, 
and compliance. Its innovative obligations concerning indigenous and local 
communities are yet another example of the creative nature of the CBD regime, while 
giving rise to new implementation challenges.  
The Nagoya Protocol arguably promotes an integrative interpretation and 
coherent implementation of the CBD. Its objective not only reflects verbatim the third 
CBD objective but also explicitly links it to the convention’s first and second 
objectives.84 The same integrative approach seems to be supported by the protocol’s 
general clause encouraging users and providers to direct benefits arising from the 
utilization of genetic resources towards conservation and sustainable use.85 This goal 
is further supported by the provision on the possible establishment of a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, through which benefits arising from the use 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge that occur in transboundary situations, 
or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent (PIC), are to 
support the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components 
globally.86 
                                                
81 The deadline had been fixed for COP-10 by Decision VIII/4 on Access and Benefit-Sharing, Doc. 
CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (2006) at para. 6. 
82 See Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
supra note 73. During the closing plenary, a number of delegations including the African 
Group, the Central and Eastern European Group, Venezuela, and Bolivia made statements for 
the record to underscore their doubts about the new instrument’s quality and effectiveness. 
83 Decision X/1 on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from Their Utilization, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010). The Nagoya Protocol, 
supra note 16, includes twenty-seven preambular clauses, thirty-six operative provisions, and 
an annex containing an indicative list of monetary and non-monetary benefits, which 
replicates the list included in the Bonn Guidelines. 
84 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 1, states that ‘[t]he objective of this Protocol is the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, 
taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of its components’ [emphasis added]. 
85 Ibid., Article 9. 
86 Ibid., Article 10. The multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism was devised as a compromise solution 
to divergences on the temporal scope of the Nagoya Protocol. See E. Tsioumani, Access and 
Benefit-Sharing: The Nagoya Protocol 40 Envt’l Pol’y & L. 288 at 289 (2010). The 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol will address the possible establishment 
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
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The Nagoya Protocol applies to genetic resources within the scope of Article 
15 of the convention (on access to genetic resources),87 to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources within the scope of the convention, and to the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such resources and of such knowledge.88 The 
reference to traditional knowledge marks a departure from the CBD. While Articles 1 
(on objectives) and 15 of the CBD do not explicitly mention traditional knowledge, it 
is addressed in the context of in situ conservation in Article 8(j). The convention thus 
only provides for benefit sharing with regard to traditional knowledge, innovations, 
and practices that are relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
and does not explicitly refer to traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources. Still, traditional knowledge under the CBD has been mostly discussed in 
the context of Article 15,89 and, accordingly, traditional knowledge was addressed in 
the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol on the basis of a combined reading of 
Articles 15 and 8(j). This interpretation reflects the fact that genetic resources 
frequently attract the interest of bioprospectors and gain value because of the 
traditional knowledge associated with them. In other words, it is traditional 
knowledge that sparks the utilization process or provides the initial interest in the 
potentially useful properties of a genetic resource. In these cases, genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge are arguably inseparable.90 
A first assessment of the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol related to 
traditional knowledge indicates that, despite their often ambiguous language and 
references to national legislation, they create significant obligations for parties, 
additional to those provided by the CBD text. Specifically, parties are required to take 
the appropriate legislative, administrative, or policy measures to ensure that benefits 
arising from the utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
are shared in a fair and equitable way and on mutually agreed terms with the 
communities holding such knowledge.91 
The Nagoya Protocol also includes another unprecedented obligation for 
parties, which was the subject of arduous debate because of its links to human rights 
issues, including land and territorial rights, and issues of national sovereignty. The 
obligation calls for the adoption of domestic measures to ensure sharing of benefits 
arising from the use of genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities.92 
The provision makes a reference to domestic legislation regarding the established 
rights of communities over these genetic resources, and it arguably intends to ensure 
                                                                                                                                      
of the multilateral mechanism at its second meeting (Decision X/1, supra note 81, section B, 
para. 10 (work plan for the Intergovernmental Committee), scheduled for April 2012. 
87 One of the key issues in relation to scope was the issue of ‘derivatives’ of genetic resources. See 
Tsioumani, supra note 84 at 289.  
88 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 3. 
89 Since the launch of the negotiations for an international ABS regime, the CBD Working Group on 
Article 8(j) has been addressing ABS as a permanent issue in its agenda. See, for instance, the 
Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/7 
(2007), and Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working 
Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2 (2009), Annex II on the international regime on access and 
benefit-sharing: provision of views to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Access and Benefit-
sharing [Report of the Sixth Meeting]. 
90 See the Report of the Sixth Meeting, supra note 89 at 36. This was also reflected in the Nagoya 
Protocol’s preamble. 
91 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 5(1). 
92 Ibid., Article 5(2) [emphasis added]. 
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that the protocol creates no new rights for communities over genetic resources, when 
such rights are not already established under domestic law. Nonetheless, it remains to 
be seen how courts will interpret this provision in light of relevant international 
human rights instruments,93 including the right to self-determination94 and the rights 
to lands, territories, and resources traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples.95 
Another unprecedented international obligation concerns access to traditional 
knowledge.96 Parties are required to put in place national measures to ensure that 
traditional knowledge is accessed with the PIC of local and indigenous communities 
or with their approval and involvement. The latter is a formulation that was insisted 
upon during the negotiations by those resisting recognition of the right to PIC to 
indigenous and local communities.97 Arguably, the provision also implicitly covers 
the right of the community to refuse access to its traditional knowledge.98 
The far-reaching provision on traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources is complemented by several other legal obligations of procedural nature for 
parties vis-à-vis indigenous and local communities, namely to take into consideration 
communities’ customary laws, community protocols, and procedures regarding 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources; to establish mechanisms to 
inform potential users of traditional knowledge about their obligations towards 
communities; and to endeavour to support the development of community protocols 
and the minimum requirements for mutually agreed terms and model contractual 
clauses for benefit sharing by communities.99 The Nagoya Protocol also prohibits 
restricting the customary use and exchange of genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge within and among communities.100 Therefore, the provision 
                                                
93 See M. Alexander, P. Hardison, and M. Ahren, Study on Compliance in Relation to the Customary 
Law of Indigenous and Local Communities, National Law, across Jurisdictions, and 
International Law, <http://www.cbd.int/doc/programmes/abs/studies/study-regime-06-en.pdf> 
at n. 55.  
94 Enshrined in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(1966); and Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res 
61/295 (2007) [UNDRIP]. 
95 Enshrined in Articles 13-15 of the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries of the International Labor Organization, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (1989); 
and Article 26 of the UNDRIP, supra note 94. 
96 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 7. 
97 Note that the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues at its 2011 session noted that the term 
‘consultation’ cannot replace or undermine the right of indigenous peoples to prior informed 
consent. See the Report on the Tenth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, UN Doc. E/2011/43-E/C.19/2011/1416 (27 May 2011) at para. 36. 
98 In this context, it should be noted that the draft policy objectives and core principles for the 
protection of traditional knowledge currently under negotiation in the framework of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) include a similar 
principle. The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objectives and Principles, 
Document prepared by the WIPO IGC Secretariat, Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/18/5 (2011), 
Annex, at 5. 
99 The term ‘community protocols’ refers to the bio-cultural protocol – an innovative tool to bridge the 
international concept of benefit sharing with communities’ needs, aspirations, and livelihoods 
at the local level. It was experimented by Natural Justice, a legal non-governmental 
organization working with communities in southern Africa, India, and Kenya. See United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Community Protocols for ABS (undated), 
<http://www.unep.org/communityprotocols/index.asp>; and H. Jonas, K. Bavikatte, and H. 
Shrumm, Community Protocols and Access and Benefit Sharing 12 Asian Biotechnology and 
Dev. Rev. 49 (2010). 
100 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 12. 
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refers both to a recognition of customary laws and procedures by domestic legal 
systems and to the establishment of mechanisms to facilitate implementation of ABS-
related regulations with regard to traditional knowledge. In addition, the parties are to 
support the communities’ implementation of their ABS regulations by empowering 
and preparing them to develop ABS arrangements. Such capacity-building provisions 
are also reflected in other protocol provisions, including provisions on awareness 
raising101 and capacity building.102 
Yet other unprecedented international obligations can be found in the 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol on compliance. Parties are required to take 
‘appropriate, effective and proportionate legislative, administrative or policy 
measures’ to ensure that genetic resources and traditional knowledge utilized within 
their jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with the legislation and 
requirements of the party that provided them.103 This provision makes national 
legislation of both the provider and the user country indispensable for implementing 
the Nagoya Protocol’s requirements. Implementation of such provisions would 
require the establishment of some kind of mechanism in countries with users in their 
jurisdiction that would ensure that these users receive information on, and respect, the 
legislation of the countries that have provided the genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge. The fact that only a few countries have drafted domestic legislation on 
ABS, despite the adoption of the non-binding Bonn Guidelines in 2002, indicates that 
these earlier efforts to provide international guidance have not been successful in 
overcoming the complexities of implementing ABS at the national level and that 
innovative solutions are still required for the Nagoya Protocol to be operationalized. 
Another key provision of the Nagoya Protocol, and a result of lengthy 
negotiations and a series of compromises, relates to monitoring the utilization of 
genetic resources at the national level in order to support compliance, including the 
designation of checkpoints.104 Developed and developing countries had directly 
opposing views on the necessity for mandatory checkpoints, on the kind of 
information such checkpoints would manage, and on the disclosure requirements and 
consequences of non-compliance. The final text combines an international law 
obligation to establish checkpoints, as appropriate, with the flexibility to select those 
checkpoints that are most suited to national circumstances. The link between national 
and international levels of implementation is then guaranteed by an internationally 
recognized certificate of compliance, which aims to serve as evidence at the 
international level that the genetic resource that it covers has been accessed in 
accordance with PIC and that mutually agreed terms have been established at the 
national level.105 The certificate basically consists of a national permit on ABS that is 
made available on the ABS clearinghouse – an international centralized information 
system that is expected to give certainty to both users and providers – and that will 
offer some sort of independent verification of ABS decisions on the ground. 
Operationalization of this certificate is expected to draw significantly from experience 
gained in the permitting framework under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.106 
                                                
101 Ibid., Article 21. 
102 Ibid., Article 22. 
103 Ibid., Articles 15 and 16. 
104 Ibid., Article 17. 
105 Ibid., Article 13(3). 
106 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 993 U.N.T.S. 
243 (1973) [CITES]. 
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It remains to be seen how compliance with these unprecedented obligations 
will be monitored. Currently, there is no existing compliance mechanism under an 
MEA to address state compliance with obligations vis-à-vis indigenous and local 
communities or state compliance with obligations to ensure that users respect other 
countries’ national legislation. The Nagoya Protocol simply includes an enabling 
clause on monitoring compliance at the international level, foreseeing the future 
establishment of a compliance mechanism of a cooperative and non-adversarial 
nature.107 In earlier negotiations, certain parties had argued for the establishment of a 
subsidiary body under the Nagoya Protocol to assist in the assessment of 
implementation, considering information communicated by parties.108 Another 
innovative idea that had emerged in earlier negotiations, but did not make it in the 
agreed text, was the proposed establishment of an international ombudsperson to 
support developing countries and indigenous and local communities to identify 
breaches of rights and to provide technical and legal support in ensuring the effective 
redress of such breaches.109 If established, such an innovative feature in the MEA 
landscape (which is more familiar in the human rights context) would potentially 
result in an international institution being able to work in the field directly with 
communities, while enabling such communities to have immediate access to an 
international avenue for their complaints related to the protocol.110  
While it may take several years before the Nagoya Protocol enters into force, 
CBD parties are already anticipating significant compliance challenges with regard to, 
in particular, drafting national legislation and setting up measures to implement 
requirements regarding the decision-making structures needed to grant PIC; building 
the capacity of national institutes and indigenous and local communities to negotiate 
mutually agreed terms; and enforcing national legislation, particularly through 
building the ability of selected authorities to monitor genetic resources at the 
established checkpoints. Critical implementation issues are also expected to arise with 
regard to the extra-territorial application of provider countries’ ABS legislation as 
required in the protocol. It thus remains to be seen whether the Nagoya Protocol will 
prove instrumental in setting up the international structures needed and in guiding the 
development of national legislation that are necessary to respond to developing 
countries’ and indigenous peoples’ expectations regarding biopiracy and the 
stewardship of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. It is equally too early to 
determine whether the protocol will ultimately operationalize ABS as a tool for 
sustainable development and as an innovative funding mechanism for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
 
V. TIME FOR INDIGENOUS ‘PEOPLES’ AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES UNDER THE CBD? 
 
                                                
107 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 16, Article 30. 
108 Briefing Note: Summary of the Interregional Negotiating Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing: 18-
21 September 2010, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
<http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/absing/brief/absing_briefe.html>. 
109 See Article 14 bis in Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.5 Annex I (2010).  
110 A comparable institution can be found in the context of the World Bank family: the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the International Finance Corporation. See the CAO website 
at <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/>. For a discussion, see E. Morgera, Human Rights 
Dimensions of Corporate Environmental Accountability, in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni, and U. 
Petersmann, eds., Human Rights, Investment Law and Investor-State Arbitration, 511 (2009). 
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In light of the innovative provisions of the Nagoya Protocol on indigenous and local 
communities, this section discusses the relevance of several other decisions of COP-
10 that are related to Article 8(j) of the CBD as a crosscutting element for the 
coherent implementation of the convention. This examination provides an opportunity 
to further discuss the evolution of the CBD regime, focusing on the influence of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and examining the 
potential importance of future work in differentiating indigenous peoples from local 
communities under the convention.111 
The CBD has emerged as the ‘primary instrument’ and the preferred 
international forum for indigenous and local communities to express their interests 
and demands for the protection of their traditional knowledge,112 particularly within 
the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j), which affords community representatives 
broad participation rights.113 The work of the CBD on indigenous and local 
communities is founded on Article 8(j), which, with a significantly qualified 
formulation, calls on parties to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of the knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous and 
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.114 Traditional knowledge is not defined, 
although it is understood as the knowledge of useful properties of biological resources 
that is attributed to a community as a whole, notwithstanding the differences in the 
dissemination of knowledge from one community to another, and that is preserved for 
generations and transmitted orally.115 
While the text of the CBD carefully avoids the use of the term ‘right’ or cross-
references to human rights instruments,116 successive COP decisions have gradually 
explored rights-based dimensions of biodiversity policy making.117 COP-10 referred 
                                                
111  For a full discussion of the CBD COP-10 outcomes for indigenous and local communities, see the 
report on indigenous peoples by E. Morgera in this issue of Yearbook. 
112 Meyer, supra note 5 at 41-42; B. Richardson, Indigenous Peoples, International Law and 
Sustainability 10 R.E.C.I.E.L. 1 at 8 (2001). 
113 Decision IV/9 on Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, Doc. CBD (1998), which 
established the Working Group on Article 8(j), calls for participation of indigenous and local 
communities ‘to the widest possible extent … in accordance with the rules of procedure’ (at 
para. 2). In practice, this rule has resulted in the establishment of enhanced procedural rights 
for representatives of indigenous and local communities in the CBD processes. In the 
Working Group on Article 8(j), these representatives are allowed to take the floor on equal 
footing with parties and in the ABS negotiations their textual proposals were tabled, if 
supported by at least one CBD party. A departure from this good practice model, however, 
was witnessed during the final days of the ABS negotiations in Nagoya, when a series of 
traditional knowledge-related issues were addressed in a closed group composed of CBD 
parties only. See Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, supra note 73. 
114 CBD, supra note 1, Article 1, refers to ‘the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of its components.’ It should be noted, however, that the text of the convention refers 
inconsistently to the sustainable use of ‘biodiversity’ or of ‘biological resources.’ See S. 
Johnston, Sustainability, Biodiversity and International Law, in M. Bowman and C. Redgwell, 
eds., International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity 51 at 56 (1996). 
115 Meyer, supra note 5 at 38. 
116 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra note 8 at 626-28. 
117 Notably, the work programs on Article 8(j), on protected areas, and on forest biodiversity 
(Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in CBD Decision V/16 on Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000), Annex; Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas, adopted by CBD COP Decision VII/28 on Protected Areas, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (2004), Annex; and Expanded Programme of Work on Forest 
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to the UNDRIP in the preamble of the Nagoya Protocol and called for ‘taking note as 
appropriate’ of the UNDRIP in implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011-20118 and the program of work on protected areas.119 Still, the CBD COP has not 
fully endorsed UNDRIP-inspired language, notably demonstrating the lack of an 
unqualified reliance by CBD parties on PIC, as underscored earlier in this article.  
As the implications of Article 8(j) have so far been mostly discussed in the 
context of the ABS negotiations,120 the conclusion of the Nagoya Protocol has created 
the policy space for the COP to shift its focus to other traditional knowledge-related 
issues, namely customary use. This issue is expected to be addressed in the new 
multi-year program of work on Article 8(j), with a view to developing further 
guidance on sustainable customary use and related incentive measures for indigenous 
and local communities and to considering measures to increase communities’ 
engagement at the national and local levels in the implementation of Article 10 (on 
the sustainable use of biodiversity) and the ecosystem approach. The COP has thus 
tasked the Working Group on Article 8(j) to develop a strategy to integrate 
sustainable use, particularly customary use, as a crosscutting issue into all CBD work 
programmes and thematic areas, beginning with the work programme on protected 
areas.121 This mandate seems particularly significant in light of the considerable 
evolution of the concept of benefit sharing, as it applied to the relationship between a 
state and communities within its territory under other work programmes and 
guidelines adopted by the CBD COP prior to COP-10.122  
This area of future work of the CBD also seems particularly relevant in light 
of recent developments in other fora, such as in the UN Forum on Forests, where 
attention has focused on benefit sharing from forest conservation and sustainable use 
as a key to community livelihoods123 as well as in human rights bodies concerned 
with natural resource development led by private companies in areas traditionally 
occupied by indigenous peoples.124  
It is also notable that the COP implicitly decided to explore for the first time 
the dividing line between indigenous and local communities. The expression 
‘indigenous and local communities’ so far has been taken as an indivisible whole 
under the CBD, without reference being made to ‘indigenous peoples’ as the subjects 
                                                                                                                                      
Biological Diversity, COP Decision VI/22 on Forest Biological Diversity, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002)). 
118 Decision X/2, supra note 47 at para. 4. 
119 Decision X/31 on Protected Areas, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. 1(i). 
120 Although the ABS negotiations were held within the CBD Working Group on ABS, the 
international ABS regime also dominated negotiations at the CBD Working Group on Article 
8(j) and related provisions. See recently Summary of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Intersessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the CBD, 2-6 
November 2009 9(482) Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2009).  
121 Decision X/43 on Multi-year Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related 
Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 
(2010) at para. 8. 
122 Morgera and Tsioumani, supra note 13 at 159-65. 
123 UN Forum on Forests, Resolution on Forests for People, Livelihoods and Poverty Eradication (4 
February 2011), 
<http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/session_documents/unff9/Adopted%20resolution%20at%
20530PM%20%204%20Feb%202011.pdf>. 
124 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of 28 
November 2007 Series C, No. 172; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Communication no. 276/2003 on the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (2010). 
(2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3-40 
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protected by specific international human rights instruments.125 In an unprecedented 
move, COP-10 convened an ad hoc expert group meeting of local community 
representatives to identify the common characteristics of local communities and to 
gather advice on how local communities can more effectively participate in the 
convention processes, including at the national level.126 In this respect, it should be 
noted that in 2010 the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues called on the CBD 
parties to adopt the UNDRIP’s terminology ‘indigenous peoples and local 
communities.’127 This can indeed be considered overdue under the CBD, as this 
terminology has already been adopted by the UN General Assembly,128 the UN 
Forum on Forests,129 and under the international climate change regime.130 
 While human rights language and key concepts are not yet fully integrated 
into the CBD, it should be emphasized that certain key CBD instruments and 
guidelines have already been relied upon extensively by human rights instruments and 
practices. The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has stressed 
the link between PIC, benefit sharing, and mitigation measures in the context of large-
scale natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples’ territories or in the creation 
of national parks and forest and game reserves, underscoring the importance of the 
CBD work program on protected areas and the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for 
the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Regarding 
Developments Proposed to Take Place, or Which Are Likely to Impact on Sacred 
Sites, and Lands, and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous People 
and Local Communities (Akwé: Kon Guidelines).131 The special rapporteur on the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, has 
clearly indicated that the CBD concepts and guidelines can significantly contribute to 
fleshing out standards for corporate accountability with respect to indigenous rights in 
the context of the due diligence framework proposed by the UN Special 
Representative on Human Rights and Business.132 Anaya thus emphasized that social 
and environmental impact studies should be conducted on behalf of companies by 
independent experts under the supervision of the state, specifically referring to the 
                                                
125 Meyer, supra note 5 at 38. 
126 Decision X/43 on Multi-Year Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. 21. 
127 Report of the Ninth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indingeous Issues (19-30 April 2010), 
UN Doc. E/2010/43-E/C.19/2010/15 (2010). 
128 UNGA Resolution 65/178 on Agriculture Development and Food Security (2010). 
129 UN Forum for Forests, supra note 123. 
130 In the context of safeguards for REDD+, see Decision 1/CP.16 on Outcome of the Work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Doc. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2010), Appendices I to III.  
131 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment Regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place, or Which Are Likely to Impact 
on Sacred Sites, and Lands, and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous People 
and Local Communities, supra note 38; Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Progress Report on the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in 
Decision Making, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35 (2010); and Report of the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Its Third Session, Geneva, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/36 (2010). 
132 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ‘Business and Human Rights: 
Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/11/13 (2009). 
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CBD’s Akwé: Kon Guidelines.133 Similar recommendations can also be found in the 
context of the implementation mechanism of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Guidelines on Multinational Companies.134 
 
VI. THE NEW STRATEGIC PLAN: VISION, COHERENCE, AND MONITORING? 
 
While the work of the CBD on traditional knowledge is set to expand and become 
mainstreamed, the new strategic plan for the period 2011-20 – one of COP-10 main 
outcomes – aims to serve as an overarching framework for coordinating all of the 
activities of the CBD under its program areas, for assisting in mainstreaming 
biodiversity across all human activities, and also for valuing ecosystems services and 
monitoring the progress in implementation by facilitating the setting of targets at 
different levels that are adapted to regional, national, and sub-national contexts and 
capacities.135  
As a key instrument with the potential to ensure a coherent application of the 
CBD regime, the strategic plan, entitled ‘Living in Harmony with Nature,’ comprises 
a shared vision, a mission, strategic goals, and targets that are expected to inspire 
broad-based action by the CBD parties and stakeholders. The vision states that by 
2050 biodiversity will be valued, conserved, restored, and wisely used, maintaining 
ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet, and delivering benefits essential for 
all people. The mission provides for taking effective and urgent action to halt the loss 
of biodiversity so that by 2020 ecosystems will be resilient and will continue to 
provide essential services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life and 
contributing to human well-being and poverty eradication. It will achieve this goal 
through, inter alia, restoration, biodiversity mainstreaming, and the application of the 
precautionary approach. Its most notable strategic goals and headline targets will urge 
parties to: integrate biodiversity values not only into national and local planning (as 
already mandated by CBD Article 6) but also into national accounting; ensure 
restoration and the safeguarding of essential ecosystem services such as those related 
to water, health, livelihoods, and well-being; eliminate, phase out, or reform 
incentives, including subsidies, that are harmful to biodiversity; and develop and 
apply positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
taking into account national socio-economic conditions.  
While the strategic plan may be a useful tool to monitor progress in 
implementation and spur national and international action, only three of its targets are 
accompanied by a numerical indication. Target 5 provides for habitat change 
(including deforestation) to be reduced by half or more; Target 11 provides that by 
2020 at least 17 percent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 percent of coastal and 
marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services, will be conserved through effective and equitable management, ecological 
representation, and well-connected systems of protected areas and other effective 
area-based conservation measures; and Target 15 provides that by 2020 ecosystem 
resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks will be enhanced 
through conservation and restoration, including restoration of at least 15 percent of 
                                                
133 James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37 (2010). 
134 UK National Focal Point to the OECD Guidelines, Final Statement dated 25 September 2009 on the 
complaint from Survival International against Vedanta. 
135 See Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
supra note 73, Analysis.  
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the degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and to combating desertification. While these three targets refer to land and 
water areas where measurement is immediately possible, it may be argued that other 
targets have an built-in quantitative element,136 which may allow in fact for a 
quantitative analysis of progress.137 Furthermore, the COP seems to have endorsed the 
TEEB approach in the strategic plan since it requests the Secretariat to build on the 
results of the study in order to further develop implementation tools for the integration 
of economic aspects of biodiversity and ecosystem services and to facilitate 
implementation and capacity building for such tools.138 
Although some commentators have criticized the strategic plan for not 
including any binding commitments on conservation,139 the criticism appears 
misconstrued as the plan was conceived and negotiated solely to serve as an 
inspirational document and as a strategic framework for action.140 In addition, its 
focus lies in the implementation of all three of the CBD objectives rather than 
focusing solely on biodiversity conservation. A more valid critique is that the strategic 
plan provides only limited guidance for developing specific measures and tools, 
including legislative instruments, to enhance national implementation of the CBD.  
Still, two elements can be identified in the strategic plan that provide hope 
both for facilitating national implementation and for initiating some kind of 
international oversight of CBD implementation. First, the strategic plan calls for 
regional and sub-regional workshops on updating and revising NBSAPs, 
mainstreaming biodiversity, enhancing the clearinghouse mechanism as a 
fundamental tool for information sharing, and mobilizing financial resources. Second, 
the strategic plan calls for an analysis/synthesis of national, regional, and other 
actions to enable the WGRI to assess their contribution towards the global targets.141 
This analysis would be coupled with the possibility for the COP to develop further 
guidance and propose options for the establishment of mechanisms to support parties 
in their efforts to develop national indicators and associated biodiversity monitoring 
and reporting systems, in support of setting targets, according to national priorities 
and capacities, and in the monitoring of progress towards them.142 In addition, the 
decision on the CBD’s multi-year program of work further emphasizes 
implementation and monitoring, by placing on the agenda a review of the progress in 
the implementation of both the strategic plan and the resource mobilization strategy 
(discussed later in this article) and in the provision of assistance and support to 
                                                
136 For instance, Target 8 states ‘pollution has been brought to levels that are not detrimental for 
ecosystem functioning  (which may be understood as below critical N loads, thus being 
determined objectively)’; and Target 6 states ‘all stocks are harvested sustainably by 2020’.  
137 We are grateful to David Cooper for having drawn our attention to this point. 
138 Decision X/2, supra note 47 at paras. 7 and 17(e). 
139 S. Harrop, Living in Harmony with Nature?’ Outcomes of the 2010 Nagoya Conference of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 23 J. Envt’l L. 117 at 122 (2011); and G. Monbiot, A 
Ghost Agreement, posted on 1 November 2010, <http://www.monbiot.com/2010/11/01/a-
ghost-agreement/>.  
140 It was never supposed to be legally binding. Rather, its purpose is to ‘promote effective 
implementation of the Convention through a strategic approach … that will inspire broad-
based action by all Parties and stakeholders.’ Decision X/2, supra note 47 at para. 1 [emphasis 
added]. 
141 Ibid. at paras. 17(a) and (b). 
142 Decision X/7 on Examination of the outcome-oriented goals and targets (and associated indicators) 
and consideration of their possible adjustment for the period beyond 2010, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. 5(c). We are grateful to David Cooper for having 
drawn our attention to this point. 
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developing country parties. COP-12 (which is to be held in 2014) will in turn further 
consider how the CBD’s implementation contributes to the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals.143 All of these developments may inaugurate a more 
focused process of compliance monitoring at the international level. 
 
VII. FINANCE-RELATED DECISIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON BUT 
DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES AT A CROSSROADS  
 
Questions related to coherence, effective implementation, and monitoring have also 
characterized recent debates on funding under the CBD. The continuous expansion of 
activities under the convention has increased the demands for adequate financial 
resources, capacity building, and technology transfer to enable implementation by 
developing countries and the main holders of global biodiversity. The finance-related 
provisions of the CBD are the core of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility as it is applied to biodiversity. The convention includes a specific 
obligation for developed country parties to provide new and additional financial 
resources to enable developing country parties to meet the agreed full incremental 
implementation costs of complying with commitments under the CBD.144 As opposed 
to other MEAs, the CBD contains quite specific obligations for developing countries 
in regard to the national funding of activities implementing the convention.145 
Nonetheless, inadequate provision of financial resources required for effective 
implementation of the convention has been one of the main reasons why the 2010 
biodiversity target has failed to be reached.  
 Financial cooperation under the CBD is thus seen as an expression of the 
common concern for biodiversity conservation.146 The increased focus on 
implementation under the convention has drawn more attention to the fulfilment of 
the financial provisions of the CBD, whereas until 2010 the CBD COP had not 
devoted much attention to this question. Notwithstanding the fact that the relevant 
provisions of the CBD are crafted in clearly mandatory language, the COP has not yet 
provided opinions or guidance about how individual parties are to report on their 
compliance with the financial provisions. The COP has only offered an overview of 
the aggregate status of financing for biodiversity and guidance for a variety of funding 
stakeholders.147 As opposed to other MEAs, the CBD COP has neither listed 
indications from developing countries (in their national reports) in regard to the 
                                                
143 Decision X/9, supra note 70. On the link between the CBD and the Millennium Development Goals, 
see C. Lasen Diaz, Biodiversity for Sustainable Development: The CBD’s Contribution to the 
MDGs 15 R.E.C.I.E.L. 30 (2006). 
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are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.’ This has been 
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147 Ibid. at 215 and 218-19. 
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proposed projects for financing under the convention nor proceeded to determine the 
joint funding needs of developing countries.148 
 This approach, however, may be set to change. COP-10 witnessed arduous 
debates on the implementation of the resource mobilization strategy, the role of 
innovative financial mechanisms, and the state of finances under the CBD, as well as 
on related questions of capacity for implementation and fairness in the setting of 
international goals. As noted earlier in this article, consensus on a strong finance-
related package was seen as a precondition for reaching agreement on the strategic 
plan by developing countries. 
COP-10 engaged in the review of the resource mobilization strategy, which 
was adopted in 2008 to achieve multiple aims, including to improve the information 
base on funding needs, gaps, and priorities; to strengthen national capacities for 
resource utilization; to strengthen existing financial institutions; to explore new and 
innovative financial mechanisms; to build capacity for resource mobilization and 
promote South-South cooperation as a complement to North-South cooperation; and 
to enhance the global engagement for resource mobilization.149 The review proved 
particularly contentious in two respects: (1) the establishment of a specific mechanism 
to monitor implementation of the strategy as a means to closely check how developed 
counties fulfil their financial responsibilities under the convention and (2) the more 
systematic use of innovative financial mechanisms.  
Developed countries’ uneasiness about the possible monitoring of their 
compliance with financial cooperation provisions emerged in the context of 
discussions on the definition of targets and indicators for this purpose. Compromise 
was reached in the end on providing a ‘roadmap’ for the adoption of targets at COP-
11, coupled with the immediate adoption of indicators. These indicators already 
include ways to monitor biodiversity funding, by looking into: aggregated financial 
flows of biodiversity-related funding per annum, avoiding double-counting (the latter 
qualification may be particularly significant for the use of climate financing used to 
achieve biodiversity co-benefits); the amount of funding provided to the GEF and 
allocated to biodiversity; the number of international financing institutions and other 
international organizations with biodiversity as a crosscutting policy; the amount of 
financial resources from developed to developing countries to contribute to the CBD 
objectives; and the resources mobilized from the removal, reform, or phase out of 
incentives harmful to biodiversity, including subsidies (as promoted by the new 
strategic plan).  
Increased attention to the actual implementation of funding obligations was 
then coupled with increased emphasis on explicitly conditioning developing 
countries’ compliance with new and more ambitious targets upon the provision of 
international funds. In this respect, the strategic plan includes a headline target that 
makes reaching the other targets dependent on the provision of financial resources. 
According to Target 20, by 2020 the mobilization of financial resources for 
effectively implementing the Strategic Plan 2011-2020 from all sources should 
increase substantially from the current levels. This target will be subject to changes 
contingent on assessments of the resource needs of the parties. As a result, the actual 
realization of financial cooperation under the CBD may increasingly become the 
subject of more intense and formalized international scrutiny. 
                                                
148 Ibid. at 221. 
149 Decision IX/11 on Review of implementation of Articles 20 and 21, Doc. CBD 
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (2008). 
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Innovative financial mechanisms are under consideration across international 
environment and development processes, with a view to complementing public 
funding through market-based mechanisms and other involvement by non-state 
actors. To some extent, this debate builds upon the experience of the climate change 
regime. Thus, the CBD COP considered the creation of a ‘green development fund’ 
modelled after the Clean Development Mechanism to reward trade-certified ‘land 
areas managed in compliance with the CBD,’ in accordance with the requirements for 
offsets and restoration for the private sector.150 The proposal, however, encountered 
the opposition of developing countries, which wished to ensure that innovative 
financial mechanisms would supplement, and not replace, public funding under the 
CBD’s financial mechanism. The latter was reflected in the decision on the resource 
mobilization strategy,151 while the other draft text on innovative financial mechanisms 
was withdrawn altogether during the final plenary.152 
Climate-financing opportunities for biodiversity-related work were also 
discussed with a view to allowing concrete synergies between the climate change and 
the CBD regimes, both at the international and national level. In terms of international 
synergies, attention focused on providing guidance to the GEF in identifying projects 
that enhance cooperation among the Rio conventions, such as projects that 
demonstrate the role that protected areas play in addressing climate change; synergy-
oriented programmes to conserve and sustainably manage all ecosystems that also 
contribute to poverty eradication; and projects related to ecosystem conservation, the 
restoration of degraded lands and marine environments, and overall ecosystem 
integrity, which take into account climate change impacts.153 A monitoring element 
was also built in to the system – namely, parties further requested the CBD 
Secretariat, in collaboration with the GEF, to identify indicators to measure and 
facilitate reporting on the achievement of social, cultural, and economic benefits for 
biodiversity, climate change, and combating desertification and to develop tools to 
evaluate and reduce the negative impacts of mitigation and adaptation activities on 
biodiversity.154 In addition, CBD parties called upon the UNFCCC COP to support 
projects related to adaptation and mitigation in protected areas, so that national 
mitigation and adaptation actions that involve the expansion of protected-area 
networks can receive financial and technical assistance through climate-related 
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financial mechanisms.155  
Further guidance was also provided for national action, once again focusing 
on protected areas. Through the decision on protected areas, the COP invited CBD 
parties to explore how funding opportunities under adaptation and mitigation 
strategies could contribute to the implementation of the CBD work programme on 
protected areas while enhancing co-benefits for biodiversity, adaptation, and 
mitigation. Parties were further encouraged to finance the conservation and 
management of protected-area systems in contributing to carbon sequestration and the 
maintenance of carbon stocks as well as to ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation. 
Given concerns that the search for climate funding may detract from biodiversity-
focused management, however, cautionary language was added on recognizing that 
biodiversity conservation remains the primary objective of protected-area systems. 
Parties were further called upon to link improved design and management approaches 
for comprehensive and integrated protected-area systems (including buffer zones, 
corridors, and restored landscapes) into national strategies and action plans for 
addressing climate change.156   
 
 
VIII. CLIMATE AND BIODIVERSITY: INWARD AND OUTWARD MAINSTREAMING 
 
The international climate change regime has had an increasing influence on the 
discussions on innovative regulatory and funding approaches in the CBD processes. 
In addition, the CBD COP has been increasingly active in identifying threats to 
biodiversity arising from the impacts of climate change and of climate change 
response measures as well as in highlighting biodiversity’s value in the fight against 
climate change. In 2004, it identified the ecosystem approach as the tool to facilitate 
mitigation and adaptation while ensuring mutual supportiveness between the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)157 and the CBD.158 COP-10’s 
decision on biodiversity and climate change includes several innovative guidelines for 
CBD parties to assess and tackle the interactions between climate change and 
biodiversity, particularly relating to an ecosystem-based approach to adaptation.159 
Overall, COP-10 guidance aims to inject a more environmentally holistic and people-
centred approach into state practice in tackling climate change, through guarantees for 
conservation and sustainable use, the inclusion of traditional knowledge, and the 
involvement of communities in decision making and implementation.160 
Climate change has thus effectively become a key crosscutting component in 
the work of the CBD in two respects: (1) as a threat to biodiversity (the negative 
impacts of climate change, and of climate responses, on biodiversity and the 
livelihood of communities) and (2) as a response that contributes to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use (mitigation and adaptation measures with 
biodiversity co-benefits).161 In light of other climate-related decisions taken by COP-
10, the impacts of climate change and of responses to climate change that pose 
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159 Decision X/33 on Biodiversity and Climate Change, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at 
paras. 8 and 17. 
160 See Morgera, supra note 12 at 95. 
161 We are grateful to Jaime Webbe, CBD Secretariat, for drawing our attention to this point. 
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significant threats to biodiversity are now set to be addressed throughout all CBD 
activities, as are the opportunities for mitigation and adaptation measures to act as a 
new powerful vehicle for the application of the ecosystem approach.162 Nonetheless, 
challenges in fully integrating biodiversity concerns and approaches in the 
international climate change regime and other relevant international processes remain. 
To discuss these tensions and to further explore issues related to the evolution of the 
CBD regime, attention is drawn to the COP-10 decisions on cooperation with the 
international climate change regime (including in relation to forests), biofuels, the 
moratorium on geo-engineering, and financing.163  
 Increased cooperation with the international regime on climate change was 
hotly debated in 2010, with the result that a proposed joint work programme among 
the Rio conventions was eventually downgraded to the phased development of ‘joint 
activities’ related to ecosystem-based approaches to mitigation and adaptation, land 
degradation, oceans, protected areas, and forests.164 In addition, the CBD Secretariat 
received an express mandate to provide advice on the application (rather than on the 
definition) of relevant safeguards for biodiversity for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, conserving forest-carbon stocks, sustainably 
managing forests, and enhancing forest-carbon stocks (REDD+) – for approval at 
CBD COP-11 and based on consultations with the CBD parties and the participation 
of indigenous and local communities – and to identify possible indicators to assess the 
contribution of REDD in reaching the CBD’s objectives, in addition to assessing the 
potential mechanisms for monitoring impacts on biodiversity.165 The importance of 
the convention’s role in the evolution of the international climate change regime has 
thus been recognized by the CBD parties (which basically coincide with the parties to 
the UNFCCC, with the exception of the United States), with a specific focus on the 
application of the climate change regime, coupled with caution not to prejudge the 
complex negotiations in the climate forum. The latter explains why parties decided 
not to mandate the CBD to contribute to the definition of the standards but only to 
intervene at the successive stage of their implementation, so as to allow the 
conclusion of negotiations under the climate change regime. This recognition is based 
on the capacity of the CBD regime to provide tools and approaches to ensure both that 
the climate response measures, particularly REDD+, do not undermine the 
                                                
162 The following decisions, taken together, have fulfilled the COP-9 mandate to integrate climate 
change considerations into each work program of the CBD where relevant and appropriate. 
Decision IX/16A on Biodiversity and Climate Change, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 
(2008) at para. 1; Decision X/30 Mountain biological diversity, para. 5, CBD (2010); Decision 
X/28 on Inland Waters Biodiversity, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at paras. 10(l) 
and 26(c), 26(a)-(b) and 27 and 29; Decision X/29 on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity, Doc. 
CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at paras. 66, 67 77, and 7, 8(b), 13(d), and (f); Decision 
X/31, supra note 117 at paras. 14(a)-(d) and (f), 16, and 19(c); Decision X/34 on Agricultural 
Biodiversity, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. 5(a); Decision X/38 on 
Invasive Alien Species, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2010) at para. 9(a); Decision 
X/2, supra note 47; and Decision X/4, supra note 69 at para. 6. For earlier discussions on 
biodiversity and climate change in the context of the CBD, see Review of the Interlinkages 
between Biological Diversity and Climate Change, and Advice on the Integration of 
Biodiversity Considerations into the Implementation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and Its Kyoto Protocol, Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/11 
(2003). 
163 This section builds on Morgera, supra note 12. 
164 Decision X/33, supra note 159 at para. 13. 
165 Ibid. at para. 9(g)-(h). Both mandates were qualified by reference to collaboration with the members 
of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests and the need not to pre-empt future decisions 
under the UNFCCC. 
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conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity but, rather, actively contribute to 
them and that the role of indigenous and local communities in the conservation and 
sustainable use of forest biodiversity is recognized and guaranteed.166 
This dual contribution is further reflected in the recognition of biodiversity-
related and indigenous and local communities’ concerns related to biofuel production 
and use. The COP succeeded in including in the understanding of ‘biodiversity-
related socio-economic conditions that could be impacted on by biofuel production 
and use’ – an expression that delimits the CBD’s role vis-à-vis biofuels – ‘the 
consideration of land tenure and resource rights, including water, where relevant for 
the CBD implementation, and in particular the implications for indigenous and local 
communities.’167 The COP accordingly called upon parties to develop policies, 
supportive measures, environmentally sound technologies, and impact assessments to 
minimize negative impacts on such broadly defined biodiversity-related socio-
economic conditions.168 Furthermore, following intense negotiations, COP-10 agreed 
to urge governments to apply the precautionary approach to the release of synthetic 
life, cells, or genomes into the environment, acknowledging the parties’ entitlement, 
in accordance with domestic legislation, to prevent such release.169 Thus, while 
several parties have wished to limit the scope of the CBD’s normative work on 
biofuels,170 the CBD COP has demonstrated its capacity to make progress on the 
politically charged question of land tenure and resource rights as well as its readiness 
to tackle emerging issues such as synthetic biology in this context, thereby 
demonstrating the importance of its specialized contribution to the international 
debate occurring in the context of other fora. 
 Yet another example of the evolutionary nature of the CBD is the moratorium 
on geo-engineering adopted by COP-10,171 which follows upon a previously 
                                                
166 The United Nations Conference on Climate Change, which was held in December 2010 in Cancun, 
Mexico, adopted a decision on REDD+ containing reference to ‘safeguards,’ such as: respect 
for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by 
taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws; the 
need for the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular, indigenous 
peoples and local communities in implementing the decision; and the conservation of natural 
forests and biodiversity, and incentives for the protection and conservation of natural forests 
and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits, 
accompanied by a footnote on taking into account the need for sustainable livelihoods of 
indigenous peoples and local communities and their interdependence on forests in most 
countries, reflected in the UNDRIP, supra note 92, as well as in International Mother Earth 
Day. Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 123, Appendix III.C on policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, and Annex I at 1(d) and 2(e).  
167 Decision X/37 on Biofuels and Biodiversity, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, CBD (2010), at para. 2. 
168 Ibid., at paras. 6, 8 and 10. 
169 Ibid. at para. 16. 
170 Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra 
note 73 at 21-22. 
171 Decision X/33, supra note 159 at para. 8(w), which reads: ‘[T]o ensure, in line with decision IX/16 
C on ocean fertilization, in the absence of science-based, global, transparent and effective 
control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering, and in accordance with the 
precautionary approach and CBD Article 14, that no climate change-related geo-engineering 
activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on 
which to justify them and appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the 
environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts, with the 
exception of small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled 
setting  in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the 
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established moratorium on the more specific geo-engineering technique known as 
ocean fertilization.172 The COP agreed on the precise wording, setting down two 
cumulative conditions for the lifting of the moratorium (adequate scientific 
justification and adequate consideration of risks), which are to be interpreted in light 
of the precautionary approach and the obligations related to impact assessment under 
CBD Article 14. Similarly to the moratorium on ocean fertilization, there is one 
exception to the moratorium that is made subject to detailed conditions: small-scale 
scientific research may be conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with CBD 
Article 3 (namely, states’ responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction), if it is justified by the need to gather 
scientific data and is subject to a thorough prior assessment of potential impacts on 
the environment.173 Ultimately, the legal force of the geo-engineering moratorium 
may become clear in follow-up processes or activities undertaken by the parties to the 
CBD, individually or collectively,174 particularly in light of the CBD-led study of the 
gaps in the international regulatory and monitoring framework on geo-engineering, 
which complements the moratorium.175 
Overall, notwithstanding significant resistance among certain CBD parties, 
these developments under the CBD provide, on the one hand, a path for international 
co-operation on forests, biodiversity, and climate change, with a view to ensuring 
environmental sustainability in a holistic way, both within and outside the 
international climate change regime. On the other hand, the guidelines to CBD parties 
provide pragmatic suggestions, aimed at ensuring the mutually supportive 
implementation of the obligations of the CBD and of the international climate change 
regime, whether existing or under development. 
Inwardly, climate change considerations can thus be expected to significantly 
shape the immediate future of the CBD. They have the potential to help establish 
synergies among the various thematic and crosscutting areas of work of the CBD,176 
                                                                                                                                      
need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the 
potential impacts on the environment.’ 
172 Decision IX/16 C on Biodiversity and Climate Change, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 CBD (2008) at 
para. 4, reads: ‘Bearing in mind the ongoing scientific and legal analysis occurring under the 
auspices of the London Convention (1972) and the 1996 London Protocol, [the COP] requests 
Parties and urges other Governments, in accordance with the precautionary approach, to 
ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific 
basis on which to justify such activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, 
transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities; 
with the exception of small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters. Such studies 
should only be authorized if justified by the need to gather specific scientific data, and should 
also be subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts of the research studies 
on the marine environment, and be strictly controlled, and not be used for generating and 
selling carbon offsets or any other commercial purposes.’ 
173 Note that concerns have been raised as to whether reference to ‘small-scale’ can by itself preclude 
any scientific experimentation. See K. Güssow et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization: Why Further 
Research Is Needed 34 Marine Policy 911 at 915 (2010). 
174 Note in this respect that COP-10 complemented the geo-engineering moratorium by placing follow-
up discussions on geo-engineering on the agenda of the CBD COP until the international 
community agreed on appropriate global mechanism(s) for regulating and monitoring 
geoengineering. See Decision X/33, supra note 159 at paras. 9(n)-(o)). 
175 In addition to the study, the COP requested scientific information and the views of indigenous and 
local communities and other stakeholders on the possible impacts of geo-engineering 
techniques on biodiversity. See Decision X/33, supra note 159 at paras. 9(n)-(o). 
176 Morgera, supra note 15 at 154. 
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achieve biodiversity mainstreaming in policy and measures in which climate change 
is mainstreamed, and obtain additional funding for CBD implementation from 
climate-financing initiatives. Outwardly, the added value of the CBD in inputting in 
the development of the international climate change regime, while actively prevented 
from influencing negotiations in that context, has been recognized both in terms of 
facilitating an environmentally holistic approach to climate change and a participatory 
approach that duly reflects the contributions and concerns of indigenous and local 
communities. 
 
IX. GAP FILLING IN THE BIOSAFETY REGIME: THE SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL ON 
LIABILITY AND REDRESS (SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL) 
 
Another element that contributes to the further expansion of the work of the CBD is 
the adoption by MOP-5 to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol) 
of the Supplementary Protocol with regard to damage resulting from transboundary 
movements of living modified organisms (LMOs).177 The Cartagena Protocol is the 
main international instrument addressing the risks and possible damage to the 
environment arising from modern biotechnology.178 Negotiations on liability and 
redress were mandated by MOP-1 on the basis of the protocol’s Article 27.179  
While it was expected that the Supplementary Protocol would provide an 
international regime for civil liability, it resulted instead in a two-tiered instrument 
relying first on an administrative approach and secondarily on national civil liability 
systems.180 The administrative approach is fundamentally based on the establishment 
of a national authority to monitor transboundary movement of LMOs, evaluate 
damage and threats, and take (or require operators to take) response measures.181 
The Supplementary Protocol applies to damage resulting from LMOs that 
originated in a transboundary movement that started after the Cartagena Protocol’s 
entry into force.182 With respect to intentional transboundary movements, the protocol 
applies only to damage resulting from any authorized use of LMOs. The protocol also 
applies to damage resulting from unintentional transboundary movements and illegal 
transboundary movements. In addition, the protocol applies only to damage that 
                                                
177 Adopted by Decision BS-V/11 on International Rules and Procedures in the Field of Liability and 
Redress for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Living Modified 
Organisms, Doc. UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/17 (2010). See T. R. Young, Liability and 
Redress: Supplement to the Cartagena Protocol 40 Envt’l Pol’y & L. 293 (2010); and S. 
Jungcurt and N. Schabus, Liability and Redress in the Context of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 19 R.E.C.I.E.L. 197 (2010). Note that the negotiations on the Supplementary 
Protocol were in effect concluded during the fourth meeting of the Group of Friends of the 
Co-Chairs, which was held immediately prior to COP/MOP-5. See Summary of the Fifth 
Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 9(533) Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, <http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/enb09533e.html>. 
178 See, generally, R. Mackenzie and B. Eggers, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 3 J. Int’l Econ. 
L. 525 (2000). 
179 Which states: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall, at its first meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of 
international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting 
from transboundary movements of living modified organisms, analyzing and taking due 
account of the ongoing processes in international law on these matters, and shall endeavour to 
complete this process within four years.’ A Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts 
on Liability and Redress was established to that end. 
180 Jungcurt and Schabus, supra note 177 at 198. 
181 Supplementary Protocol, supra note 20, Article 5. 
182 Ibid., Article 3. 
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occurs in areas within the limits of the national jurisdiction of parties. The 
Supplementary Protocol thus does not apply to issues of inter-state liability,183 as it 
does not affect the rights and obligations of states under the rules of general 
international law with respect to the responsibility of states for internationally 
wrongful acts.184 
Importantly, few of the Supplementary Protocol’s provisions are drafted in 
mandatory language, and its implementation is largely left to national legislation – the 
exact content and elements of which are to be defined by governments on the basis of 
national circumstances. A causal link ‘shall’ be established between the damage and 
the LMO in question in accordance with domestic law,185 and parties ‘shall’ require 
the appropriate operator to take a series of response measures in the event of damage, 
including to immediately inform the competent authority, evaluate the damage, and 
take appropriate response measures.186 Consequently, parties to the Supplementary 
Protocol are required to provide for rules and procedures to address damage,187 and 
response measures in case damage occurs. The exact content of such response 
measures is to a great degree left to their discretion. The same goes for the 
application, or not, of civil liability procedures. Similarly, issues related to time 
limits,188 financial limits,189 and financial security190 are left entirely to national 
discretion. These provisions exemplify the ‘administrative approach’ negotiators 
opted for, which allowed the deadlock in negotiations to be overcome. 
The adoption of the Supplementary Protocol formally closed the remaining 
gap in the legal structure related to biosafety. The flexibility of the administrative 
approach is designed to facilitate ratifications in order to avoid the situation 
experienced in other fora where long-negotiated liability instruments failed to enter 
into force. The Supplementary Protocol, thus, has a good chance for expeditious entry 
into force. Whether this approach will be useful for implementation remains to be 
seen, as future parties will have to adopt national legislation on a complex and largely 
uncharted legal field. 
More generally, the approach of the Supplementary Protocol and its reference 
to ‘biodiversity damage’ may be relevant beyond the context of biosafety, with regard 
to other threats to biodiversity addressed by the CBD (for instance, invasive alien 
species) and to the general consideration of liability and redress under the convention, 
which is scheduled for COP-12 in 2014,191 with a view to further discussing questions 
related to the prevention, valuation, and restoration of damage to biodiversity and the 
establishment and implementation of relevant national regimes.192 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
 
CBD COP-10 was rightly celebrated as a major success in the history of the 
convention. It culminated years of significant normative development by the CBD 
                                                
183 See Young, supra note 177 at 294. 
184 Supplementary Protocol, supra note 20, Article 11. 
185 Ibid., Article 4. 
186 Ibid., Article 5, 
187 Ibid., Article 12 on implementation and relation to civil liability. 
188 Ibid., Article 7. 
189 Ibid., Article 8. 
190 Ibid., Article 10. 
191 Decision X/9, supra note 70 at para. b(vii). We are grateful to David Cooper for drawing our 
attention to this point. 
192 Decision IX/21 on Liability and Redress, Doc. CBD UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (2008). 
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COP. COP-10, however, also gave rise to a series of questions related to the future of 
the convention. How far can the scope of the convention be stretched? How can 
parties, particularly those with limited financial means, respond to the challenges 
arising from the proliferation and fragmentation of CBD’s process? And, ultimately, 
is this working mode an efficient way to fulfil the convention’s three objectives?  
It has been argued for a while that the CBD should move away from policy 
development and focus on implementation, particularly encouraging concrete results 
at the national and local level.193 With two new protocols and a wide range of 
decisions adopted at COP-10, country obligations have expanded considerably, 
particularly for those opting to ratify the two protocols. In addition, because of the 
new governance structure that will support the Nagoya Protocol, the risk of further 
fragmentation under the CBD is even higher, if the experience of the Cartagena 
Protocol is anything to go by. In many respects, the biosafety regime has developed 
into an independent sub-process that has little, if any, link with the CBD. Institutional 
fragmentation, however, can be explained and arguably justified on the basis of the 
very specific and technical nature of the Cartagena Protocol’s subject matter. This is 
not the case for the Nagoya Protocol, whose text maintains strong links to the CBD’s 
three objectives.  
Nonetheless, while the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol provide 
for an international compliance mechanism of their own, there remains a gap in 
systematically monitoring compliance with the other key obligations of the CBD at 
the international level. CBD parties have shown signs of readiness to discuss the need 
for improved international procedures to monitor implementation and compliance, 
particularly with the financial solidarity obligations of developed countries. It remains 
to be seen, however, whether this realization will effectively mark the future of the 
convention. 
 The CBD Secretariat has arguably ‘struggled to have its exact role defined 
with the recent shift of focus from policy development to implementation.’194 And, to 
some extent, it may be difficult for the Secretariat to shift to an implementation-
focused mode, without a more decisive role in actively supporting and systematically 
monitoring national implementation. The series of capacity-building workshops 
organized in 2010-11 is a useful first step that could lead to a more systematic 
practice of the Secretariat in providing advisory and capacity-building services on the 
ground. A renewed and quality-focused effort in monitoring the development of 
national legislative frameworks and the coherent application of the three objectives of 
the convention would also be a welcome evolution, which could build on ongoing 
activities of other international conventions or processes and provide a necessary 
complement to the quantitative, aggregated monitoring that will emerge from the new 
strategic plan.195  
Continued normative activity at the international level nonetheless remains 
necessary, particularly in light of new and emerging threats to biodiversity that can 
                                                
193 Johnston, supra note 2 at 229. 
194 Xiang and Meehan, supra note 44 at 224. 
195 The current, light-touch, practice of the CBD Secretariat vis-à-vis national legislation is in stark 
contrast with the proactive approach, for instance, of the CITES Secretariat’s advisory role on 
legislation and the CITES National Legislation Project (CITES, supra note 104, Resolution 
Conf. 8.4), which enables the Secretariat to analyze the parties’ national legislation and 
determine whether it is sufficient to adequately implement CITES. For a comparative 
discussion, see E. Morgera et al., Implementation Challenges and Compliance in MEA 
Negotiations, in P. Chasek and L. Wagner, eds., The Roads from Rio: Lessons Learned from 
Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations [forthcoming 2012]. 
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derive from other international processes. The CBD regime has provided timely and 
specialized contributions to the international community in a remarkably participatory 
way – particularly in so far as indigenous and local communities are concerned.196 
Such contributions, including on ocean fertilization, biofuels, and geo-engineering, 
have resulted in widespread understanding of the threats to biodiversity, of the 
linkages between biodiversity and other global environmental issues, and of the 
possible responses. In addition, the CBD COP has found inter-governmental 
consensus on instruments that push forward broader agendas related to a rights-based 
approach to environmental policy, such as the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines, which are 
frequently referenced by other international processes. To continue serving these 
goals, however, the CBD bodies’ agenda needs to be prioritized and the COP 
decisions need to be more concise, better organized, and implementation-friendly.  
 Ultimately, it is up to the CBD parties to ensure that the CBD regime is 
coherent and fully implemented. To this end, parties are expected to honour 
commitments regarding finance and technology transfer, both to make 
implementation possible and to enable trust building at the international level as well 
as to collaborate more systematically and in-depth in monitoring exercises. Effective 
implementation is also dependent on taking advantage of the flexible drafting of the 
convention to adapt international guidance to national and local circumstances rather 
than using the open-ended language to cover up inadequate compliance.197 
Furthermore, international negotiators, legal practitioners, and academics still have to 
fully appreciate the normative work undertaken in the context of the CBD and the 
extent to which the convention has evolved since its adoption. Albeit in a confusing 
and partly obscure manner, the CBD COP has successfully developed key convention 
provisions well beyond the expectations of its drafters and has identified concrete 
procedural steps for implementation both at the national level and through 
international cooperation.198  
                                                
196 The CBD regime certainly affords many more opportunities for stakeholder participation in 
international decision making than other processes, such as the international climate change 
regime (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (1998) and the 
negotiations on the marine environment under the aegis of the UN General Assembly (for 
anecdotal evidence, see Highlights of the Fourth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal 
Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biological Diversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction 25(69) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
(2 June 2011). 
197 For instance, the non-legally binding character of the 2008 CBD moratorium on ocean fertilization 
was the root of a dispute between the German ministries for research and for the environment, 
which eventually ended with the German government admitting that ocean fertilization could 
not be accepted as a mitigation measure and that scientific projects had to comply with 
internationally agreed standards. Harald Ginzky, Ocean Fertilization as Climate Change 
Mitigation Measure: Considerations under International Law 7 J. Eur. Envt’l & Planning L. 
57 at 57-59, n. 34 (2010). 
198 Of the authors that have discussed the legal significance of multilateral environmental agreements’ 
COP decisions, none has referred to the specific case of the CBD. See, for instance, Robin 
Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law 94 A.J.I.L. 
623 (2000); Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-making under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); Annecoos Wiersema, The New 
International Law-Makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements 31 Michigan J. Int’l L. 231 (2009); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Consent to Be Bound: 
Anything New under the Sun? 74 Nordic J. Int’l L. (2005) 483. 
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An in-depth understanding of this significant normative evolution seems thus 
an indispensable foundation for stepping up implementation at all levels. The 
ecosystem-based approach and some of the key guidelines elaborated under the 
convention, in particular, can effectively serve as a versatile tool to ensure an 
integrated application of the three objectives of the CBD as well as mutual 
supportiveness between the convention and different areas of international and 
national law.199  
 
                                                
199 Which can be considered the raison d’être of the CBD. See McGraw, supra note 6 at 24. 
